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Drawing on previously unused objective institutional data, we provide evidence 
for the causal link between rent-seeking behavior and democracy in Uruguay, a 
country where both rent-seeking behavior and political shifts have varied widely 
in the last 80 years, but where ethnolinguistic heterogeneity and income inequality 
have remained historically low. The latter helps better identify some  “pure” 
political interactions and how they are linked with rent-seeking outcomes.  We 
find that the presence and duration of democratic regimes appear to have been 
conducive to a decrease in rent-seeking actions in Uruguay, although the 
reduction in rent seeking does not appear to have had a bearing on the quality of 
democratic regime in the country. While the duration of democratic regime may 
impact rent-seeking behavior, rent seeking also displays a causal link to 
democratic duration. 
 
Key words: Rent-Seeking, Causality, Democracy, Political Cleavage, Uruguay 
 
 
                                                                 
* We are grateful to Martín Rama for generously providing the data used in this paper. Arturo Galindo, Florencio 
López-de-Silanes, Eduardo Lora, Alejandro Micco, Martin Rama, and Luisa Zanforlin provided useful comments 
and suggestions. All errors are ours. The views and opinions in this paper should not be attributed to the Inter-
American Development Bank or the World Bank.  1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we empirically examine the direction of causality between democracy and rent 
seeking. In fact, it has been claimed both that democratic regimes may reduce rent-seeking 
behavior in societies and that rent-seeking behavior may contribute to the downfall of democratic 
regimes. Since theoretical research shows that given reasonable conditions both are likely to 
occur (McGuire and Olson, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), the actual relationship between 
these two variables has t o be uncovered by analyzing it from empirical and historical 
perspectives. In fact, historically, democratic political regimes have provided stability and have 
helped reduce uncertainty in the population by helping to defend societies against roving bandits 
(Olson, 1982). This can result in an improvement and stabilization of the institutional setting of 
the society through the provision of clear formal and informal rules and regulations regarding the 
interaction of actors. Consequently, it has been claimed that rent-seeking behavior will also 
decrease.   
On the other hand, pervasive rent seeking may translate into an increased degree of 
uncertainty among the population, which may send mixed signals to the market, affecting the 
productive process, economic performance, the organization of the country and, ultimately, the 
democratic process.  In fact, a recent wave of empirical research focuses mostly exclusively on 
the link between institutional quality and economic performance (Mauro, 1995; Knack and 
Keefer, 1997; Chong and Zanforlin, 2004). This is particularly relevant in Latin America, where 
a clear understanding of the relationship between institutions, economic performance, and 
political regimes may help explain the seemingly puzzling choice of inward-looking policies by 
rulers, and especially the persistence of such policies even when it was clear that they were 
doomed to fail (Taylor, 1998). Perhaps the choice of government economic policies and 
performance has to do with Latin America’s particular political setting. According to Taylor, 
interest groups might have played a role, especially since the politics in the region typically have 
been marked by dramatic cleavages between different classes and groups. Only when the costs of 
maintaining inward-looking policies became too high did such phases end.  These factors may 
help explain both the choice and persistence of inward-looking development policies in the 
region, as well as the role played by autocratic governments in the region.
1   
                                                                 
1 Chong and Zanforlin (2005) contrast Olson’s theory of encompassing interest with Robinson’s (1997) theory of 
political underdevelopment, Rothbard’s concept of psychic income (Coyne, 2003), and the unconstrained Leviathan   5
Lack of data has not allowed for an adequate study of the direction of causality between 
political regimes and institutional quality. The few available studies are either mainly of a 
descriptive nature or use indirect or subjective data that, despite being widely employed, are 
controversial. They also tend to use cross-country approaches that may suffer from an omitted 
variables problem that cannot be controlled by simply applying fixed effects.
2 In fact, it has been 
claimed that there are several problems with the use of subjective data in economic research 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). For instance, in the specific case of institutional data, 
evaluators may be influenced by a country’s economic conditions as they may assume that a 
specific institutional aspect cannot be severe if the country is doing well economically (Mauro, 
1995). Furthermore, as there are no guidelines as to what constitutes an “expert” evaluator, 
assessments may be rendered essentially worthless.
3  Therefore, in order to analyze this possible 
double causality we use a historical time-series of objective rent-seeking data based on 
discretionary foreign trade regulations that permits us to explore the time-series dimension of the 
link between rent seeking and democracy.
4 We chose the particular case of Uruguay, a small, 
historically stable, and ethnically and culturally homogeneous Latin American country. Uruguay 
provides an excellent case from the point of view of a rent-seeking society as it represents an 
extreme case of discretionary trade policies t hat lasted for decades, first, via an import-
substitution strategy that was characterized by high protective trade barriers, multiple exchange 
rates, and an explicit policy that allocated discretionary foreign exchange, approved import 
licenses, and banned imports that competed with domestic production; and second, via an export 
promotion strategy which, while not as explicit as the import-substitution approach, was  
nonetheless actively pursued for considerable periods of time (Rama, 1991).    
While we find evidence that democratic processes and rent seeking are causally linked in 
both directions, we find that democracies per se are not conducive to improved institutions; 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
view of Brennan and Buchanan (2000). When taking into account the above views, Olson’s idea of encompassing 
interest does not help explain the fact that autocratic governments may tend to act in a predatory manner even when 
rulers expect long-term prospects.   
2 Clague et al. (1996) offer a methodology that uses money supply, which they call “contract intensive money” that 
allows the construction of an objective database on institutional quality. The data, however, have been criticized and 
thus have remained virtually unused by researchers. 
3 Mauro (1995) argues that the evidence for the accuracy and relevance of the indices is provided  by the 
considerable price that clients are willing to pay in order to obtain the assessments.   
4 There is some work in the political economy of trade protection, in particular Amelung (1989), Baldwin (1989), 
Hillman (1989), and Weck-Hannemann (1991). However, the emphasis is on case studies and not formal aggregate-
level empirical evidence. An exception is Rama (1994), who uses some of the same data as this paper but focuses 
less on the political processes per se and more on trade policy issues instead.   6
democratic longevity, however, is. In fact, not only do we see that the longer the duration of 
democracy, the lower the discretionary rent seeking regulations, but also the less pervasive the 
rent seeking in a society. On the other hand, the causal impact of rent-seeking actions on 
democracies appears to be quite dramatic regardless of whether the variable of interest is 
democracy or duration of democracy.   
This paper is organized as follows. The next section, Section 2, describes the panel 
autoregressive VAR empirical methodology employed in order to assess causality between our 
variables of interest. Section 3 describes the data employed and provides basic statistics, and 
Section 4 presents the evidence. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Methodology 
   
In this paper we focus on the dynamic relationship between our variables of interest as well as on 
the direction of causality and their implied contribution to the possible correlation among these 
variables. The first step is to analyze the dynamic relationship between rent seeking and 
democracy. The objective is to examine how the behavior of one given variable is related to the 
future behavior of the other.  This future behavior has two aspects: effect and predictability.  The 
first deals with whether changes in one variable have a lasting impact on another variable.  The 
second examines whether the behavior of one given variable helps predict the behavior of the 
other. Our methodology consists of estimating and testing vector autoregressions (VAR) in a 
panel setting that has the following form: 
t i i t t i t i t i x L B y L A y , , , , ) ( ) ( e m h + + + + =                                   (1) 
t i i t t i t i t i x L D y L C x , , , , ) ( ) ( u y f + + + + =                                   (2) 
where y and x represent the two variables of interest, rent seeking and democracy; L is the lag 
operator; A, B, C, and D are vectors of coefficients; ht and ft are unobserved time effects; mi and 
yi are unobserved fixed country effects, and ei,t and ni,t are regression residuals.  Note that we 
also control for other determinants, Z, in particular the log of output, the export orientation of the 
country in any given year, and whether the country was following import substitution policies in 
any given year. The subscripts i and t denote country and time, respectively.
5   
                                                                 
5 The above was the most comprehensive specification employed. Data restrictions did not allow for alternative 
specifications. However, as mentioned above, fixed effects were employed throughout.   7
As is standard in non-structural VAR analysis, no cross-equation parameter restrictions 
are imposed, we allow for a free cross-equation error covariance, and we interpret each equation 
as a reduced-form regression. We have chosen the optimal lag structure for the panel VARs 
through likelihood ratio tests. As described above, by testing for the dynamic relationship 
between institutions and inequality, we are interested in exploring the impact that changes in one 
variable, say x (rent-seeking), has on the other, say y (democracy).  The direct impact of x (rent-
seeking) on y (democracy), given the past history of y (democracy), is given by the sum of the 
coefficients on all lagged x (rent-seeking).  Using the properties of the lag operator, this impact 
would be equal to B(1).  From an estimation of the VAR, we can obtain the point estimate of B(1) 
and, for the purpose of statistical inference, its associated standard deviation.
6    
The second step is to examine whether a variable, say x (rent-seeking), helps forecast the 
other variable in the system, say y (democracy), beyond what the past history of y (democracy) 
predicts.
7  This is a test of Granger-causality, and, in the example above, it amounts to testing if 
the coefficients of the lag polynomial B are statistically significantly different from zero. Notice 
that the two issues of interest—namely, impact and Granger-causality—are related but not 
identical.  There may be cases when one variable has predictive power for another, yet its impact 
is zero because coefficients on different lags cancel each other out. However, in the relationships 
we consider, it is usually the case that when the impact is statistically zero there is also no 
indication of Granger causality.  In this context, and based on the work of Geweke (1982) and 
Chong and Calderón (2000), we take a more complete approach than unidirectional Granger-
causality tests by measuring the degree of linear dependence and feedback between two panel 
series x (rent-seeking) and y (democracy).  We do this by measuring the sum of linear feedback 
from x (rent-seeking) to y (democracy), linear feedback from y (democracy) to x (rent-seeking), 
and “instantaneous” linear feedback between x (rent-seeking) and y (democracy). Absence of a 
particular causal ordering implies that one of these feedback measures is equal to zero. In 
particular, let us denote zt = (yt, xt)’ the vector with information on the variables x (rent-seeking) 
                                                                 
6 From the estimated coefficients we can also obtain the long-run effect of x  on y.  The long-run effect takes into 
account both the direct impact of x on y (given the past history of y) and the autoregressive properties of y (to 
account for its own and cross feedback effects).  Provided that y follows a stable process, the long-run effect of x on 
y is given by B(1)/[1-A(1)]. 
7 In Granger causality tests, if x causes y, x should help predict y. That is, in a regression of y against past values of 
y, the addition of past values of x as independent variables are expected to contribute to the explanatory power of the 
regression in an statistically significant manner. Furthermore, y is expected not to help predict x, as if this is the case 
and y helps predict x, then other variables are causing x and y.  Also, see Table 1.   8









The proposed decomposition test is based on likelihood ratios comparing the following three 
system representations, as shown in Table 1. From these systems, the objective is to test a 
specific set of measures of linear feedback.  The proposed measures to be tested are shown in 
Table 2 (Chong and Calderón, 2000).  
In summary, the basic principle of our empirical approach to test for causality is to apply 
Granger causality tests to study the direction of the link between rent seeking and democracy.  
Unlike most studies, however, the key emphasis of our empirical work is to decompose the 
contribution of each direction of causality between rent seeking and inequality by using a test of 
linear dependence and feedback. Thus, in order to explore issues of simultaneity, we decompose 
the correlation between rent-seeking actions and political factors into the three possible 
directions, that is, democracy to rent seeking (xﬁy), rent seeking to democracy (yﬁx), and 
contemporaneous correlation (x￿y). To perform this analysis we follow the procedure for panel 
data developed by Chong and Calderón (2000). We report the results for two specific variables: 




We use legislative data originally collected by Rama (1994) for Uruguay on a yearly basis from 
1925-1983.
8 This researcher painstakingly collected discretionary trade policy information 
published by Uruguay’s Official Registry of Laws and Decrees.  He constructed a rent-seeking 
database for this country by individually counting the number of statutes which had created, 
maintained, or modified a foreign-trade regulation for the benefit of a single firm or industry 
during the cited period. Examples are tariffs for final goods, changes in import duties for inputs, 
export subsidies, special exchange rates, reference prices, draw-back regimes, import licenses, 
export prohibitions, tax payment relief, and others. All in all, at the firm level, the available 
dataset contains 4,042 observations or rent-seeking actions for the time period 1925 to1983, 
although depending on the empirical method not all of the information is necessarily used. The 
data are quite rich, as they contain detailed information on the type of private rent-seeking 
resolution, such as law, decree, or administrative regulation enacted, the basic area to which the 
                                                                 
8 The ending year corresponds to the last published issue of the data source (Rama, 1994).   9
resolution was linked, either exports or imports, and the corresponding productive sector, defined 
at the two-digit level ISIC code. 
In order to be consistent with the six-decade economic cycle that corresponds to the 
sample, we scale our variable of interest using data on aggregate output level at constant prices 
which are only available from 1935 onward.
9 Additionally, we calculate an index where the 
average of rent-seeking actions during the period 1935 to 1983 equals 100.
10  Table 3 presents 
summary statistics. Overall, we find that rent-seeking activities represent 0.45 percent of gross 
domestic product in Uruguay for the period 1925 to 1983, of which 47 percent of petitions may 
be identified with particular firms or persons. In other words, identified actions refer to those 
rent-seeking actions that were explicitly tied to a particular group, firm, or individual as the 
beneficiary of the discretionary trade policy. On the other hand, non-identified actions refer to 
those that were not explicitly tied to a specific beneficiary of the rent-seeking policy or action. 
The premise is that firms or groups that were not openly identified as beneficiaries of 
discretionary trade policies may have been able to take greater advantage of the system through 
actions such as the extraction of higher rents. Similarly, manufacturing represents the bulk of 
activities, with more than 81 percent, and rent-seeking regulations linked with imports 
outnumber those linked with exports by about 20 percentage points. Furthermore, Supreme 
Decrees are the legal device used most often, accounting for 67 percent of such actions. In fact, 
when focusing on the type of law used when issuing discretionary policies in trade, it is expected 
that there will be differences when rent-seeking actions are implemented through  supreme 
resolutions  rather than  supreme decrees (Calderon and Chong, 2005).  This is somewhat 
unsurprising as the latter, more frequently associated with less democratic regimes, tends to be 
easier to hide and undo as opposed to the former, which tends to be the product of more 
transparent interaction among agents.  In fact, while the passing of supreme resolutions requires 
a lengthy and widely discussed process in Parliament, the passing of supreme decrees requires 
                                                                 
9 Rama (1994) also uses exports and imports as additional deflators. When replicating our empirical work using 
these other deflators our findings do not change. On the interest of economy these findings are not reported but are 
available upon request. Data related with number of firms, the natural deflator, are not available.  
10 Note that although we have individual information on rent-seeking actions since 1925, we are limited to carrying 
out our analysis from 1935 onward due to the lack of data for real GDP. 
   10
less of such political coordination and typically needs the approval of the Executive branch 
only.
11   
With respect to tariff and non-tariff barriers, the former is slightly more predominant than 
the latter (five percentage points). However, this pattern varies depending on whether the 
political regime is a democracy or not, and whether or not the trade orientation of the country 
prioritizes export promotion or import substitution policies. In general, tariff barriers include (i) 
tariff rates or, in the case of exports, subsidy rates, (ii) the reference price used to calculate tariffs 
and subsidies, which are frequently used instead of the actual international price; and (iii)  
exchange rates, which from 1933 to 1959 were multiple exchange rates. On the other hand, non-
tariff barriers include the item’s position, quotas, and other non-price related barriers. 
Data on democracy and duration of democracy come from the well-known Polity V data 
set by Gurr and Jaggers (1998), which is an annual index based on three categories accounting 
for different characteristics of the political process:  executive recruitment,  independence of 
authority, and political competition. The first measures the extent of institutionalization, the 
competitiveness of executive selection in terms of electoral systems, and the openness of 
executive recruitment.  The second reflects the extent to which preferences of third parties are 
taken into account. The third reflects the extent to which the political system enables the non-
elite to influence the political elite.  This index of democracy goes from zero to 10, with higher 
scores representing higher degrees of democracy. Additional standard controls, such as terms of 
trade, rates of growth, an import substitution dummy, and an export promotion dummy come 
from Rama (1994) and the World Bank (2004).
12 
In Table 4 we present simple correlation measures between rent seeking and democracy. 
We find that the former is negatively correlated with democracy (-0.43) regardless of economic 
sector. Furthermore, rent seeking is negatively associated with duration of democracy (-0.66) and 
most other measures of democracy. 
                                                                 
11 Furthermore, some regulations likely require even less political interaction, as their passage does not necessarily 
require approval from the higher echelons of the Executive and thus may follow a somewhat less transparent path 
(Calderón and Chong, 2005).   
12 Note that the results for the components of the institutionalized democracy index (say, executive regulation and 
political participation measures) are consistent with the result of the aggregate index. Results are available from the 
authors upon request.   11
4. Findings 
 
Table 5 presents our basic results. In the case of Uruguay, we find that from 1935 to 1983, 
democracy helps predict rent-seeking actions, as the obtained causal  link is statistically 
significant at ten percent or better. Furthermore, we find that such a causal link is negative and 
statistically significant at five percent or better, which means that the claims that democracies 
breed rent-seeking behavior are not accurate.
13 Much to the contrary, democratic regimes help to 
reduce rent-seeking behavior.  The causal relationship between our variables of interest holds 
regardless of how the rent-seeking activity is classified. In particular, the causal relationship that 
goes from democracy to total rent-seeking actions accounts for 72 percent of the total correlation 
found between these two variables. A similar such causal relationship accounts for more than 80 
percent of the total correlation found in manufacturing activities, more than 50 percent in 
agriculture, and nearly 80 percent in services. A similar pattern is observed when analyzing the 
results from the perspective of trade orientation. The share of the causal relationship running 
from democracy to rent seeking  is 86 percent and 55 percent for exports and imports, 
respectively. In short, the same pattern showing a causal link going from democracy to rent 
seeking holds in almost all subcategories considered.  While it is clear that democracy is 
conducive to better institutional quality in a society, we find strong evidence that the opposite 
does not hold true. A reduction in rent-seeking activities does not appear to be conducive to an 
improved democratic regime in Uruguay. It appears that regardless of the country’s 
improvements in institutional quality, it was not rewarded with improved democratic processes 
in the long run.  In fact, not only is the correlation share that goes from rent seeking to 
democracy quite low, but also the direction of this causal link is  statistically insignificant 
regardless of the trading activity or economic activity considered. This is also shown in Table 5. 
Perhaps one should not be focusing on the presence of democratic regimes per se, but 
rather on whether such regimes are well established in the country. In order to explore this idea, 
we examine the duration of democratic spells in Uruguay and apply the causality tests described 
above. Results are shown in Table 6. The picture we find is less uniform than in the case of 
democracy and rent seeking.  There is still a causal link that goes from duration of democracy to 
rent-seeking actions, but it is somewhat less compelling. There appears to be no causal link 
                                                                 
13 For the sake of economy regressions results are not presented, but we would be happy to provide them upon 
request.   12
between duration of democracy and total rent seeking-actions; however, such a causal link may 
exist in specific economic subcategories. For instance, when analyzing the results by economic 
activity, we find that duration of democracy helps predict subsequent rent-seeking actions in both 
agriculture and manufacturing at the 5 percent level, with the share of this causal direction at 
approximately 47 and 56 percent of the total correlation, respectively. However, the same cannot 
be said in the case of services, where this causal direction accounts for only 15 percent of the 
total correlation and is not even statistically significant. In the case of trading activities we also 
find that duration of democracy in Uruguay is a statistically significant predictor of future rent-
seeking actions, as the corresponding empirical test yields a t-statistic of 5 percent. Interestingly, 
while the causal direction from duration of democracy to rent-seeking actions accounts for 80 
percent of the total correlation in exports, it accounts for only 52 percent of the total correlation 
in imports.  On the other hand, the causal link that goes from rent-seeking actions to democratic 
duration is statistically significant in some cases but not uniformly so.  This is the case with total 
rent-seeking actions, where we find that the causal relationship from total rent-seeking actions to 
democratic duration accounts for 60 percent of the total correlation found between these two 
variables. We obtain similar results in the cases of manufacturing, services, and imports. In fact, 
we find that the causal relationship from rent seeking to democratic duration is around 42 
percent, 69 percent, and 37 percent, respectively, in relation to the total correlation found 
between these two variables. 
In summary, while historically the presence and duration of democratic regimes appear to 
have been conducive to the lowering of rent-seeking actions in Uruguay, reduction in rent-
seeking activities does not appear to have had a bearing on the quality of democratic regime in 
the country. However, we find some partial evidence to show that whereas the duration of the 
democratic regime may impact rent-seeking behavior, the latter also displays a causal link with 
democratic duration, in particular at a broad economic level.  
 
5. Final Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this paper we use objective institutional historical data in order to test the causal link between 
presence and duration of democracies and rent-seeking behavior using an autoregressive VAR 
approach and methodology devised by Chong and Calderón (2000) based on Granger-causality   13
tests.  In order to minimize recent criticisms on country heterogeneity we focus on the case of 
Uruguay, an ethnically homogeneous Latin American country.  Overall, we find that democratic 
quality is causally linked with rent-seeking actions in Uruguay and that the contribution of such a 
link to the total correlation between these two variables is quite significant, regardless of the 
economic activity or trading activity considered. However, we also find that there is virtually no 
causal link that goes from r ent-seeking behavior to democratic quality. This last finding, 
however, needs to be qualified somewhat as not only does democratic duration appear to display 
a causal link with respect to rent-seeking actions in Uruguay, but rent seeking-actions also 
display a causal link to democratic duration. 
In the context of recent backlash against democracies in Latin America, the findings 
above are remarkable. While it may be argued that young democracies tend to struggle with 
inefficient institutional behavior, according to the conventional wisdom once democracies take 
hold and political constraints are minimized, institutions will improve and thus rent-seeking 
behavior will subside.
14 Whereas both historically low institutional quality and poor democratic 
institutions have been fundamental shortcomings in the region (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997), 
the findings here appear to show that policymakers may be well advised to further pursue 
democratic regimes, even in the face of hostile response, as this will help institutional 
development which, in turn, may further help consolidate democratic processes. 
  
                                                                 
14 In fact, according to the theory of encompassing interest, rulers with expectations of having a long tenure in power 
have an incentive for providing good institutions, in the form of adequate property rights, an enforceable rule of law, 
and an efficient judiciary system (Olson, 1993; Wittman, 1989).  This is because, in a repeated game context, good 
institutions and good policies are expected to contribute towards the growth and stability of the economy which will 
thus translate into higher permanent returns for the ruler in the form of taxes and other rents.     14
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Table 1.  Feedback Decomposition Tests 
 
System  Representation of 
Parameter Matrices 
Var-Cov Matrix of 
Residuals 
Causality Tests 

























































Current values of 
y (x) are functions 
of m past values of 
y (x) only. 
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Table 2.  Linear Feedback Statistics and Empirical Tests 
 
Linear Feedback  Statistic  Null Hypothesis 














11 ln  
H0: Fxﬁ y = 0, i.e. “x does not 


















22 ln  
H0: F yﬁ x = 0, i.e. “y does not 

































22 ln  
H0: Fx￿y = 0, i.e. “no 
instantaneous causality 
between y and x.” 
Linear Dependence  
(Fx,y) 
(Fx ,y) = Fx ﬁ y + Fy ﬁ x + Fx￿ y  H0: F x,y = 0, i.e. “no linear 
association between y and x.” 
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Table 3.  
Rent-Seeking and Democracy in Uruguay 1925-1983, Summary Statistics 
 











Total Actions  100.00  85.62  122.70  97.59  90.57 
    (42.5)  (34.3)  (45.1)  (42.3)  (44.2) 
  - Identified  47.0  43.5  52.6  49.2  40.8 
    (21.7)  (18.2)  (25.9)  (21.7)  (12.9) 
  - Non-Identified  53.0  42.1  70.1  48.4  49.8 
    (29.0)  (20.6)  (32.6)  (27.3)  (35.2) 
By Economic Activity           
  - Manufacturing  81.01  67.52  102.31  76.09  74.77 
    (37.4)  (29.5)  (39.4)  (35.1)  (46.5) 
  - Non-Manufacturing  18.99  18.11  20.39  21.50  15.79 
    (11.0)  (8.1)  (14.5)  (10.7)  (6.7) 
By Trading Activity           
  - Exports  40.58  24.57  65.86  29.98  46.26 
    (36.1)  (21.4)  (40.5)  (26.1)  (51.0) 
  - Imports  59.30  60.92  56.74  67.45  44.30 
    (27.3)  (18.2)  (37.9)  (23.5)  (16.8) 
By Type of Law           
  - Supreme Decree  67.26  73.66  57.16  76.26  54.65 
    (32.2)  (25.6)  (39.2)  (27.6)  (21.6) 
  - Supreme Resolution  32.51  11.92  65.01  21.05  35.85 
    (37.1)  (18.9)  (35.5)  (27.4)  (51.4) 
By Type of Action           
  - Non-Tariff Barriers  49.53  49.80  49.11  54.23  36.69 
    (21.5)  (18.0)  (26.8)  (20.9)  (8.7) 
  - Tariff Barriers  44.24  30.46  65.99  36.44  47.23 
    (31.4)  (21.5)  (32.6)  (25.3)  (44.2) 
              
             
Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Rent-seeking actions in Uruguay as percentage of gross domestic product, 
1935-1983. Average total actions during the period equals 100 (average 1935-1983= 100).   Standard deviations 
shown in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Rent-Seeking and Democracy in Uruguay, 1925-1983, Simple Correlation 
 
    Duration of  Institutional  Executive  Executive  Political 
Actions  Democracy  Democracy  Recruitment  Constraints  Competition 
             
Total Actions  -0.6582  -0.4320  -0.5901  -0.5373  0.0148 
    (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.918) 
  - Identified  -0.4888  -0.2847  -0.5034  -0.4251  0.2202 
    (0.001)  (0.052)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.130) 
  - Non-Identified  -0.5976  -0.4192  -0.4871  -0.4684  -0.1431 
    (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.321) 
By Economic Activity           
  - Manufacturing  -0.6877  -0.4651  -0.5765  -0.5371  -0.0924 
    (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.521) 
  - Non-Manufacturing  -0.2041  -0.0871  -0.3201  -0.2497  0.3729 
    (0.159)  (0.545)  (0.030)  (0.087)  (0.012) 
By Trading Activity           
  - Exports  -0.6550  -0.5865  -0.5596  -0.5743  -0.4242 
    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.005) 
  - Imports  -0.1566  0.1039  -0.1765  -0.0757  0.5822 
    (0.278)  (0.471)  (0.222)  (0.599)  (0.000) 
By Type of Law           
  - Supreme Decree  -0.0460  0.1945  -0.0232  0.0218  0.5246 
    (0.749)  (0.180)  (0.872)  (0.879)  (0.001) 
  - Supreme Resolution  -0.7107  -0.6635  -0.6532  -0.6330  -0.4431 
    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003) 
By Type of Action           
  - Non-Tariff Barriers  -0.3117  -0.0013  -0.2719  -0.1678  0.4968 
    (0.034)  (0.993)  (0.063)  (0.246)  (0.001) 
  - Tariff Barriers  -0.6515  -0.5627  -0.5693  -0.5700  -0.3475 
    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.019) 
               
Rent-seeking actions in Uruguay as percentage of gross domestic product, 1935-1983. Average total actions during 
the period equals 100 (average 1935-1983= 100).  Standard deviations shown in parentheses.   21
 Table 5. Feedback Measures and Linear Dependence,  
Democracy and Rent Seeking Actions in Uruguay, 1935-1983  
 
Causal  Total  Economic Activities  Trading Activities 
Direction  Actions  Agriculture  Manufacturing  Services  Exports  Imports 
Democracy (x) and Rent Seeking Actions (y) 
















































             
The variable x represents the measure of democracy, whereas the variable y represents the measure of rent 
seeking, as measured by the number of rent-seeking actions published in legal documents in Uruguay 
from 1935 to 1983. All feedback measures are expressed as a percentage of the total correlation or linear 
dependence between democracy and rent seeking (F x,y). Hence, the causality from  democracy to rent 
seeking is represented by x? y. Similarly, the causality from rent seeking to democracy is represented by 
y ? x. Finally, instantaneous causality is represented by y . x (see Table 1 and Table 2). The statistical 
significance of each feedback measure is shown in parentheses (p-values for ?
2 tests).   22
Table 6. Feedback Measures and Linear Dependence,  
Duration of Democracy and Rent-Seeking Actions in Uruguay, 1935-1983  
 
Causal  Total  Economic Activities  Trading Activities 
Direction  Actions  Agriculture  Manufacturing  Services  Exports  Imports 
Duration of Democracy (x) and Rent Seeking Actions (y) 
















































             
The variable x represents the measure of democracy, whereas the variable y represents the measure of rent 
seeking, as measured by the number of rent-seeking actions published in legal documents in Uruguay 
from 1935 to 1983. All feedback measures are expressed as a percentage of the total correlation or linear 
dependence between democracy and rent seeking (F x,y). Hence, the causality from  democracy to rent 
seeking is represented by x? y. Similarly, the causality from rent seeking to democracy is represented by 
y ? x. Finally, instantaneous causality is represented by y . x (see Table 1 and Table 2). The statistical 
significance of each feedback measure is shown in parentheses (p-values for ?
2 tests). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 